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Ibrahim B. Anoba  






The persistent resentment towards classical liberal principles especially individualism and free market in 
contemporary Africa, represents an outcome of decades of ambush against the ideology despite its clear 
connections with traditional African philosophy and relevance to the prosperity of modern African states. 
This work attempts to draw comparisons between social and economic organisation in traditional Africa and 
classical liberal principles. Contrary to literatures that portray the community as the real and only end in 
traditional African societies, elements like free trade; market economy; consensus; anarchy and limited 
governance negates this position. While tracing the cause of Africa’s cling to socialism and communism, this 
paper presents an ideological transition from pre-colonialism to nationalist and post-independent Africa. It 
concludes by demystifying the arguments of individualism as antithetical to African morality. It also justified 
the inevitability of classical liberal principles in modern Africa.  
 







There is rarely a fiercely contested ideology in Africa as classical liberalism – often 
relegated to capitalism. The annihilation of the African academia by radical-socialists and 
Marxian philosophers since the 20th century greatly influenced the presentation of the 
origins of African life as purely socialist. Whereas, later inquiries revealed philosophical 
patterns that correlates with classical liberalism and other ideas. They also debunked the 
universality of communalism and social welfarism in traditional Africa. Although, the 
social and economic structures in some traditional African communities were communally 
designed, only because communalism was seen as the formal and best means for societal 
organization based on factors like population, kinship, and tribal solidarity. On a broader 
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spectrum, qualities like respect for individual happiness, personal interest and dignity were 
equally permitted. And in numerous communities as would be later revealed, organization 
and conduct were not dictated or divinely commanded but humanistic and utilitarian with 
overarching emphases on improving social functioning and human flourishing (Gyekye 
1995). 
Philosophers - mostly of the African traditionalist school- and scholars turned 
politicians like Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Jomo Kenyatta 
(Kenya) through their writings and patterns of governance, glued Africa’s history to social-
communism. Of course, this was at a period when literatures on African philosophy were 
scanty and public knowledge of the market system and governance were low. This 
knowledge void filled by the traditionalists has endured in the African academia for 
decades with a solid effect on public knowledge. The platform of leadership and 
scholarship made the ideological inclination quite easy for the traditionalists. Hence, the 
sustained view of philosophy as an embodiment of opinions best presented by the ruling 
class and a mere exhumation of Africa’s past and rehabilitation of culture (Kasanda 2015, 
30-32).  
 
WERE TRADITIONALISTS RIGHT ABOUT AFRICA’S SOCIAL-COMMUNIST 
FOUNDATIONS? 
 
Well, the absence of technically organized ideologies in traditional African societies 
made several historians resolved that pre-colonial Africa had no clear patterns that 
governed behavior except the unearthing of some ancestral practices. Writers like George 
Dalton identified the inability of Western economists to draw clear parallels between 
economic systems in traditional African societies to theories developed in the West as 
primary course to this conclusion (Dalton 1997, 27). Unlike Europe or the Americas where 
sufficient texts written by generations of historians exists on the cultural and philosophical 
evolution of the society, it rarely does in Africa. 
Most knowledge on the evolution of African philosophy is preserved in arts, tales 
and other literatures passed from one generation to another. Other evidences especially in 
archaeological folds rarely exist to corroborate some of the narratives. The colonial masters 
stole many, some were destroyed during wars and the surviving few gradually vanished due 
to lack of preservation by successive generations. Meanwhile, empirical inquiry into 
African philosophy never surfaced until around mid-1900s, most notably when catholic 
Father Placide Tempel published his La Philosophie Bantu (The Philosophy of the Bantu) 
in 1945 as a response to the misconceptions about the Bantu people of West Africa. 
Tempel’s book set the premise for subsequent studies in African philosophy. He refuted the 
claims by Western writers and the Catholic Church that traditional Africans had no rational 
thinking that regulated affairs but led a common primitive life.  And similar to Tempel, 
writers like Alexis Kagame attempted to create the substance for African philosophy by 
answering meta-philosophical questions -an attempt to create the philosophy of African 
philosophy- for ease of study due to absence of literatures. 
Continued investigations by African writers later revealed that the absence of 
ideological details noted by Dalton and others actually existed in African communities but 
can only be studied with cognizance to social structures such as religion and kinship 
(Ayittey 1991). Similarly, nationalist intellectuals observed that there were indeed patterns 
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peculiar to each African community resembling some of the propositions later developed in 
socialism and communism (Khoza 1994). They historically presented the collective 
purpose against individual purpose by arguing the true and only philosophy in traditional 
Africa was the philosophy of brotherhood and welfarism, which prevented anyone from 
getting prosperous than everyone. They practically rejected all notions of self-determinism 
or personal ambition as non-existence in traditional Africa. They also claimed a strongman 
leadership of interest as the choice of governance in these communities.  
In their accounts, the supreme leader or council held the right over the life of every 
member of the community and served as the judges of morality. Contrariwise, the 
philosophy of traditional Africa was not in any way relegated to principles in socialism or 
communism, but greatly extended to principles advocated in classical liberalism as would 
be seen later.   
In African antiquity, the social-communist setting was not a general obtainable 
across all communities as claimed by the traditionalists. In some groups, authority was not 
central, while in others, they never existed. Members were entitled to self-determinism, as 
many of these communities were either stateless or acephalous. Some had well-organized 
administrative structures without monarchs or a centralized ruling elite council. In 
communities such as the Tallensi (Ghana), Logoli (Kenya) and Nuer (South Sudan) there 
were no institutions that regulated social life but they were purely anarchic (Evans 1940, 5). 
In communities with clearly defined systems of governance, majority of them had 
structures for institutional ombudsman and separation of powers among governing councils 
– comparable to the tripartite system proposed by French philosopher, Baron de 
Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws (1748). These communities also treasured standards 
for checks and balances to avoid power concentration or abuse by an individual or group. 
For example, in the Igbo community (Nigeria), authority was shared among groups like the 
ofo (family heads), ozo (nobles) and the age grade groups with similar model among the 
Yoruba (Nigeria), the Bété, Dida and Baoulé (Cote d’Ivoire), the Nuer and Dinka Gnoc 
(South Sudan), the Massai (Kenya), the Nyjakusa (Tanzania) and Tonga (Zambia) tribes 
(Sesay 2014). Political decisions rested on the harmony of opinions among council 
members while individuals typically determined economic decisions. However, the absence 
of centralised structures of authority did not implied statelessness so to speak because there 
were customs and understandings that sanctioned deviant behaviors.  
Even in communities with centralized authorities, independent institutions limited 
governance, contrary to claims of a common authoritarian pattern all over. In the political 
fold, governance only existed to whatever extent public opinion agreed. Most political 
decisions greatly depended on consensus among chiefs, councils, or the public as it were, 
with cognizance to individual judgment. This individual judgment was present in form of 
household representative democracy. Every member of the community belonged to a 
household, and their opinions formed household interests, which was subsequently 
represented in councils by their elders or nobles. Societies such as the Ashanti (Ghana) and 
the Yoruba (Nigeria) emphasized individual interests through the household, with 
significant checks on monopolization of interest by their chiefs. And this was common to 
most communities. Former Zambian and Tanzanian leaders, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius 
Nyerere resolved to this fact:  
Kaunda: In our original (African) societies, we operated by consensus. An 
issue was talked out in solemn conclave until such time as agreement could 
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be achieved. Nyerere: In African society, the traditional method of 
conducting affairs is by free discussion. The elders sit under the big trees, 
and talk until they agree (Wiredu 2004).  
 
Clear enough, traditional Africans were resentful towards fortification of an 
individual to act as sole representative of choice and interest even if the individual was a 
representative of the gods. 
The misrepresentation of the political organization in traditional Africa as akin to 
social-communism as opined by most traditionalists and nationalists could be attributed to 
the twisted interpretation of the African virtue of Ubuntu: an ideology that depicts African 
humanism. Ubuntu (Zulu/Xhosa) or uMunthu (Chewa) is the bedrock of sound human 
relations in traditional Africa: the collective unconscious of intra-human relations and the 
essence of morality (Khoza 1994). It was so to speak, the foundation of African morality 
(Pauw 1996). Ubuntu, on the complex fold reflects the African understanding of humanism; 
dignity; respect and proper conduct. Augustine Musopole, a Malawian theologian saw 
uMunthu as the total human integrity and crucial to cosmic inter-relatedness, harmony and 
salvation with strong communal dimension (Musopole 1993). Its modern usage is more 
entrenched in movements like pan-Africanism, Negritude and Black Power, which 
influenced nationalist struggles for independence (Khoza 1994). Radical nationalist leaders 
build the interpretation of Ubuntu on African socialism –socialism rooted in African culture 
and values- and to them, it was the ideological foundation in post-colonial Africa. They 
observed that African life had always been community centered without relevance to 
personal interest – a bias and opaquely generalized notion as proved in this work. Most of 
the participants in the 1945 Manchester Conference including Léopold Senghor (Senegal), 
Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Sékou Touré (Guinea), Tom Mboya (Kenya), Wallace Johnson 
(Sierra Leone) and others, especially Julius Nyerere with Ujamaa in Tanzania, vehemently 
encouraged and practiced socialism in their respective states. Likewise in countries that 
fought colonialism through liberation wars like, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. 
In Tanzania for instance, Ujamaa was launched in 1967 to regenerate traditions and 
values similar to pre-colonial Tanzanian societies in a bid to institute a new welfare state 
void of enterprise or individual interest but with national and collective prosperity as its 
end. Most of the social arrangements and resurrected cultures struggled to fit in modern 
Tanzania.  
As expected, the system largely failed in both social and economic ramifications. It 
further impoverished the people and laid foundation for an economically problematic state. 
Guinea under Sékou Touré experimented with similar variant of African socialism and left 
a brutal political landscape with an acutely bizarre economy. In places where post-
independence leaders verbally advocated for capitalist economy like in Zaïre (under 
Mobutu Seko), Cameroun (Ahmadou Ahidjo), Togo (Gnassingbé Eyadema), and Gabon 
(Ali Bongo), cronyism; greed; corruption and obsession for power never allowed for 
institutionalization of a free market capitalism. And these states were practically no 
different from the former. Meanwhile, understanding the dimensions of African nationalist 
struggle is a prerequisite to uncovering why socialism and communism took root in Africa. 
The fight for independence in Africa centered on two things: to rid Africa of 
Western imperialism (by all possible means including war), and to develop the economy 
and cure poverty through radical socialist reforms. Of course, this was at the height of 
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communism in places like Cuba and the Soviet Union. With the obvious resentment 
towards the imperialist West, it was better affiliating with the communist East to firstly, 
ensure their stay in power and secondly, to institutionalize a system for effective wealth 
redistribution. It eventually made African nationalists grew heavily attached to the 
communist bloc. They collaborated in adopting economic and social structures of the 
communist states that would later prove disastrous to nation building in post-independence 
Africa. They got financial and personnel assistance; socialist principles guided pubic 
conduct in replica states; socialism as an ideology got tremendous academic appeal and the 
new Africa looked more like a glorified communist workshop. This hitherto solidified 
Africa’s ideological apology towards socialist and communist principles. 
In tracing the reasons for this easy radicalization, the massive exploitation of Africa 
under colonialism (starting from the 1870s) was in fact a primary factor. The fattening and 
industrialization of Europe on the back of Africa’s human and natural resources offered 
capitalism a ‘theft’ and an imperialist ideology intended to further subject Africa to 
continuous economic exploitation. This unfortunately coincided with a time when 
capitalism received immense glory for Western industrialization with Africa beneath the 
shaft. Logically, any idea that had been responsible for Europe’s prosperity other that 
capitalism would have certainly been an enemy of Africa.  Moreover, nearly all political 
figures in Africa vocally repelled Europe and anything Western during this period. 
Frequent rants and campaigns against capitalism often made the public appealed to the 
socialist agenda of politicians and their liberation charisma. Zimbabwean president, Robert 
Mugabe echoed this resentment in his common nature while observing:   
Capitalism did not only plunder our land and other natural resources, thus 
impoverishing our peasants and making vast communities landless, it also 
turned a substantial percentage of the population into a poor wage-worker 
class... The difference between Socialism and Capitalism is, therefore, the 
difference between equality and inequality, between equity and inequity, 
between justice and injustice (Fisher, 1978: 206). 
 
It was that bad. These reservations made independent struggles took anti-white 
racialist and tribal separatist dimensions while most nationalists experienced first-hand, the 
disparity in development between Europe and Africa as students in the West. Their return 
nonetheless, strengthened socialist resistance against continued Western capitalist 
exploitation. It peak in the early-mid 1900s and majority of Africa subsequently gained 
independence on the back of social-communist development agenda.  
Almost immediately after independence, economies improved with export gains 
reaching all-time highs with states revenue matured heavily towards the 1970s and 1980s. 
The joy was however short-lived. Economies like Nigeria, Angola, Rwanda, and Liberia 
slipped due to negative outcomes in socialist and colonialist arrangements. The promotion 
of a strong central authority by African socialism permitted politicians to massively loot an 
overwhelming percentage of wealth created during Africa’s economic boom. Corruption, 
powerful state, public restrictions and suspension of civil liberties were final bullets to the 
definite failure of the planned state across independent Africa. And the military utilized the 
familiar one-man dictatorship established under civilian rule to seize power with far worse 
damages on social, political and economic settings. Factors like the shift of interest among 
public workers, the irresistible rise of private corporations, the spontaneous reaction in 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 3, No. 1, 2017 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 




markets and the increase in individual choices over state despotism caught the ‘central 
state’ planners off-guard. As a result, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the juggling of 
economic reforms that created distortions in nearly every fold. Infamous of them was the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the Bretton Woods institutions. Hence, 
finding Africa’s lost glory in socialist and communist drawings never helped Africa, rather, 
it effectively created the foundations for a sustained problematic statism contemporaries are 
vigorously battling. 
 
THE PLACE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN AFRICAN MORALITY 
 
There is no denial of the fact that most traditional Africans valued the prosperity of 
every member of the community with preference on working in unity towards a common 
goal. There was however, an equal respect and permission for individual choices and 
interests. Traditional Africans worked on their farms to provide food for themselves and 
their families with the secondary intent of producing for exchange. There was rarely a case 
of everyone working on a community farm to produce food for everyone by equal sharing. 
Africans valued the non-universality of an individual’s abilities or needs, but permitted for 
charity and fairness in enterprise to ensure a relatively balanced society.   
The individual in African philosophy mostly existed as a reflection of his 
community. He was seen as a product of his tribe less than he was an independent being. 
His birth and death were to satisfy the wishes of the gods on earth. Like many tribes in 
Africa, several cultures according to history put the individual as a unique creation with the 
purpose of happiness and self-realization. In traditional Africa, it was best that the 
individual remained a social being. This view of man as a societal element primarily 
applied to his identification as a member of a united community in pursuant of collective 
prosperity with regards for his individual happiness. However, the expansion of groups 
during territorial wars and migration, increased community populations while conflict of 
interests among groups and individuals led to the gradual disassociation from the usual 
collective interest.  
Hence, the idea of the individual as a communal element decreased as societies 
became bigger. For example, during the hunting and gathering era when community 
populations were very small, it was easy to commit everyone to a unified goal even as few 
members harbored personal interests. However, as people integrated and population 
augmented, the individual began to isolate itself because of the geometric increase in 
interests of new members against the collective. In some cases, people left their villages in 
pursuant of personal goals. Even, members of ruling families deserted their clans due to 
conflict of interest with their kin only to establish new territories later, and the conflict of 
interest continued to repeat itself prompting the definite decrease of collectivism.  
Although, some African societies like the Xhosa and the Zulu emphasized the ideals 
of mutuality and community before the individual, there still existed self-interest. Classical 
liberals argued for a system that observes the society in light of its distinct members, for a 
society has no existence beyond the individuals that comprises it, while it is in itself a 
composition of different interests (Butler 2013).  
And the socio-economic consciousness of the society is the summary of individual 
consciousness. Friedrich Hayek puts it clear when he explained that the “associations 
within civil society exists for specific end while the civil society has no purpose; it is the 
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undersigned, spontaneous emerging result of all those purposive associations” (Hayek 
1988). Despite this similarity in purpose, contentions still exist between the two folds on 
grounds of economic and social morality among Africans.  
On the economic fold, classical liberals outrightly argued for a free market economy 
chiefly run by individual choices and price, and this was a position common in most 
economies in traditional Africa. Markets were open and less regulated. In centralized 
communities such as the Buganda (Uganda), Hausa/Fulani (Nigeria) Akan (Ghana) and the 
Zulu (South Africa), there were large and open markets such that it attracted participation 
from communities hundreds of miles away. Trade ensued among communities in their 
specialized industries with limited or no restrictions, and one can safely deduce that 
elements of David Ricardo’s Comparative Advantage Theory – a cardinal in classical 
liberalism - existed in these communities even before it was theoretically developed in 
Europe.  
One similar end to both African humanism and classical liberalism is in their 
emphasis on peace, progress and respect for human dignity through moral justifications. 
Though, the interpretation of these morals and their justifications is what differs. In 
traditional Africa, morality was whatever standard the community agreed to guide general 
conduct. To classical liberals, it is the respect for individual interests and choices, and both 
existed as the holding force for societal consciousness. In the former, values inherited 
through generations like equity and justice ensured a fair use of power and obedience to 
law to avoid conflicts among members and communities. Similarly, in the later, writers like 
Ludwig von Mises, Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, stressed the anti-imperialist and 
anti-warfare stance of classical liberalism. They saw economic liberty of communities in a 
fair market system as a way to avoid wars and foster peace.  In other words, traditional 
Africans percept morality as only attainable through inherited values, while classical 
liberals saw it in form of the peaceful decisions of individuals.  
Another misconception is the purported rejection of the principle of cooperation by 
classical liberals, which is in fact emphasized in their advocacy. The critics argued that 
market competition will eventually lead to unfair distribution of wealth and that African 
states were not ready for such experiment. Conversely, classical liberals saw cooperation as 
important as competition is to the economy. American libertarian writer David Boaz 
explained that both “cooperation and competition are essential elements of the simple 
system of natural liberty, and most humans cooperate with one another than they do 
competing” (Boaz 2015). In reality, cooperation is bound to ensue in a free-market 
economy because individuals cannot provide all their needs themselves and they must 
interact with others that can provide them in a mutually fair exchange.  Then, the cycle goes 
round to build a system dependent on fair cooperation. Education, transportation, 
technology, entertainment and especially food are variables too complex in contemporary 
societies for an individual to produce. That an individual needs these to survive makes 
cooperation inevitable.  
Besides, cooperation gets people their desires the way they please because, 
production and consumption capacities vary among individuals and it remains best when 
people determine these themselves. It is much safer than to have people equally providing 
the general need irrespective of their interests or sharing them equally regardless of their 
needs. Such scenario has invoked destructive economic bubbles in many African states.  
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The first generation writers on African philosophy falsely interpreted goodwill and 
solidarity to be state welfarism and collectivism.  Even present writers usually claim 
capitalism has bitterly failed in Africa due to its emphasis on ‘self-interest’. An average 
African still see the placement of self-interest above the collective as antithetical to African 
morality and it will ultimately monopolize dividends of the economy to a privileged few, 
whereas, it is the exact opposite. In a society where people serve the interest of others at the 
detriment of theirs, such society rests on an economic thread because there are always a 
group that would not believe in serving others due to ambition or greed. This group will get 
exceedingly rich while others are busy working in their favor, and those that remained 
devoted the common-good will eventually get exploited and poor. On the long run, the poor 
group will likely react to such imbalance with a potential of instigating an economic 
disaster. This scenario would not occur in a lawful and competitive system where everyone 
was self-interested because, value and profit is a win-win of a free market economy. To be 
self-interested is not to be greedy or exploitative; it is fairly pursuing one’s desires for a 
betterment of life. Moreover, the individual best answer the question of his self-interest.  
Equally, many African academics remain wrong in their notion that contemporary 
African states practice capitalist systems copied from Western economies (Akpan 2004; 
Obot 2004; Abiodun 2015). The first lapse is that the so-called African capitalist economies 
are in fact social-welfarist states with policies that negate the free market economy of true 
capitalism. Their economic systems are acutely crony. A cabal of wealthy men dominates 
key industries with state legislations protecting them. Such legislations usually include the 
imposition of high tariffs on industrial supplies to hold back emerging firms in specific 
industries. They also raise taxes on small businesses with many of their cronies often guilty 
of tax evasion. They enact stringent policies to limit the registration of new firms and 
restrict foreign investment in these industries, all in the quest of protecting the interest of 
the wealthy few. In return, the cabal either heavily finances their political quests or act as 
their economic joker.  These acts are common in the energy, petroleum, transportation and 
mining sectors of majority modern African states and outrightly negate anything true 
capitalism stands for. Unbiased rankings and reports on economic policies of these African 
states continues to reveal series of economic patterns correlative to crony capitalism. 
In a free market economy on the other hand, policies that favors one group at the 
detriment of others would rarely exist, because true capitalism means giving everyone 
equal opportunity at individual pace without chauvinism or protectionism. Every individual 
would have equal access to market; tax rates on small businesses are relatively low and 
entrepreneurs can access foreign markets for exchange of materials and finished products. 
It is a complete opposite of a government controlled socialist system or a crony capitalist 
arrangement. Countries like of Coted’Ivore, Mauritius and Mozambique are presently 
experiencing massive economic growth due to commendable efforts towards a free market 
economy.   
On social morality, a peculiar quality of the African life is the zeal to preserve 
culture and traditions even when in conflict with individual interest. As noted earlier, there 
was no unified lifestyle in traditional Africa except the common exhumation of culture and 
ancestral practices. In some communities, the ruling elites determined what was socially 
morally and what was not. In others, individuals had liberty to lead their desired life insofar 
it respects the liberty of others.  However, as generations, evolved, foreign influence 
penetrated the rigid cultures and newly inherited lifestyles influenced social moral 
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standards. For example, practices like monarchy; forbidden of estate; genital mutilation; 
facial and body markings; execution of homosexuals and twins among others used to be 
culturally moral and formed the nucleus of social existence. But the effects of cultural 
interactions as communities expanded with time persistently redefined socially moral 
behaviors. This is reflective in irregular changes in value and culture of modern African 
societies. Positions such as predetermined behavioral responsibility and blind adherence to 
authority ranked high decades ago, but revolts against authoritarianism, tyranny or 
subjective cultures in recent years corroborates this declination. Sorry enough, many 
traditionalists still see classical liberal principles as rather anarchist even as some African 
communities flourished under anarchy. Or adversative to traditional African principles: a 
sort of threat to Africa’s historical identity. Unlike the total anarchy assumption, classical 
liberals proposed an impartial system of justice in the custody of the state, but in trust, with 
some monopoly of force (if needed) to guarantee relative balance (Butler 2013). This was 
the exact structure in most of traditional Africa. Leaders and governing councils were 
guardians of values and preserved the justice system through impartial adherence to laws 
while public revolt was an option against tyranny. Like many other race in human history, 
traditional Africans despised tyranny. The central authority only existed as representative of 
the gods on earth, to guide the living in the right conducts only. And as Otto Lehto 
explained, "in addition to being a doctrine of maximizing free and voluntary human 
cooperation, classical liberalism is a doctrine of legal limits to coercive actions" (Lehto 
2015).  In African tradition, the individual was as important as life itself, and the respect for 
his dignity, a virtue. The only difference was that they saw the realization of individual 
prosperity as more realistic when embedded in the prosperity of his community. Even 
Kenneth Kaunda, a staunch African humanist agreed when he said:   
I am deeply concerned that this high valuation of Man and respect for 
human dignity, which is a legacy of our [African] tradition should not be 
lost in the new Africa. However “modern” and “advanced” in a Western 
sense the new nations of Africa may become, we are fiercely determined 
that this humanism will not be obscured. African society has always been 
Man-centered. We intend that it will remain so (Eze 1997, 42). 
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That traditional Africa prioritized the community over selfishness is not a 
contestable fact, but that the community was its real and only end is where the contention 
lies. The correlation of most African values like free trade and market economy on the one 
hand, constitutionally limited governance and consensus on the other hand, contradicts pre-
existing notions of a unified socialist or communist philosophy in traditional Africa.  
Nevertheless, the falsification of classical liberal principles as the sole responsible 
factor for Africa’s present socio-economic predicaments is false. Africa’s woes are solely 
due to political greediness and distortions from continued experiments with socialist ideals. 
We can fairly conclude that the negative influence of colonialism was in fact a 
cementing factor for the sporadic inclination of Africa in anti-capitalist sentiments and not 
because Africans were not naturally capitalists or that capitalist principles never existed in 
traditional Africa as presented by most philosophers. Therefore, there exists an 
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